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WILL FOWLER
Abstract. Joseph Welsh was the British Vice Consul in the port of Veracruz at the
time of the uprising of 1832 by General Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna against the
government of Anastasio Bustamante. Contravening the orders of his superiors,
who reiterated the view that it was his obligation to observe the strictest neutrality in
the conﬂict and not interfere in Mexican politics, Welsh found himself supporting
Santa Anna and the rebels. As a result, at the end of March, Bustamante’s admin-
istration demanded that he be removed from oﬃce. The British Minister Plenipo-
tentiary, Richard Pakenham, acquiesced. This article provides a narrative of the
events that led to Welsh’s forced resignation and explores what they tell us about
British diplomacy in Mexico during the early national period. It also analyses Welsh’s
understanding of the revolt and his views on Santa Anna, providing some insights,
from a generally ignored British perspective,1 into Santa Anna’s notorious appeal
and politico-military measures.
British foreign policy in nineteenth-century Latin America
According to D. C. M. Platt, in the context of Latin America during the
greater part of the nineteenth century and before 1885, ‘non-intervention in
the internal aﬀairs of foreign states was one of the most respected principles
of British diplomacy ; and force, while often called for in the protection
of British subjects injured by government action abroad, was rarely and
only exceptionally employed for the promotion of British trade and
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investments ’.2 For Platt, the view that British foreign policy in the nineteenth
century was determined by the formula ‘ trade with informal control if
possible, trade with rule when necessary, ’ did not stand up to examination.3
Tulio Halperı´n Donghi supports Platt’s view when he states that British
colonialism in Latin America was almost imperceptible since it was founded
‘on an indirect hegemony that eschewed confrontation and operated
through economic pressure ’.4 Like Halperı´n Donghi, most of the general
histories of Latin America in the last ten years present British inﬂuence in the
region, during the early national period, in terms of economic and mercantile
rather than military or political dominance.5 Yet Rory Miller notes that,
although ‘ there has been no overall reappraisal since 1968, the cumulative
eﬀect of detailed case studies is to raise doubts about Platt’s interpretation’.6
The main problems with Platt’s view lie in the fact that it relied mainly on
diplomats’ writings and paid too much attention to Foreign Oﬃce policy
formulation, rather than its implementation, in Latin America. It ignored a
reality in which the ambiguities of Foreign Oﬃce policy could excuse the
use of gunboat diplomacy.7 It did not take into account that the threat of
2 D. C. M. Platt, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade : Some Reservations, ’ The Economic History
Review, vol. XXI, no. 2 (1968), p. 297. See also by D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in
British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914 (Oxford, 1968), The Cinderella Service : British Consuls Since 1825
(London, 1971) and Latin America and British Trade 1806–1914 (London, 1972). Platt per-
suasively argues that there is little evidence that the British government sought to establish
political hegemony over new regions for the purposes of trade. Also see James Dunkerley,
Americana. The Americas in the World, around 1850 (London, 2000), pp. 305–13, for a lively
discussion of British ‘ restraint ’ in Latin America.
3 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade, ’ Economic History Review,
vol. 6 (1953), pp. 1–15.
4 Tulio Halperı´n Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin America. Edited and translated by
John Charles Chasteen (Basingstoke, 1993), p. 124.
5 Edwin Williamson, The Penguin History of Latin America (Harmondsworth, 1992) ; Peter
Bakewell, A History of Latin America (Malden and Oxford, 1997) ; Lawrence A. Clayton and
Michael L. Conniﬀ, A History of Modern Latin America (Fort Worth, 1999) ; Benjamin Keen
and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America (Boston and New York, 2000) ; John Charles
Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire. A Concise History of Latin America (New York and London,
2001) ; and Will Fowler, Latin America 1800–2000 (London, 2002).
6 Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London & New
York, 1993), p. 48. Also see Zara Steiner, ‘Review Article : Finance, Trade, and Politics in
British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914, ’ The Historical Journal, vol. 13, no. 3 (1970), pp. 545–52,
in which she questions Platt’s interpretation noting that ‘often action favouring trade in
general involved some degree of political intervention and control which the Foreign
Oﬃce accepted. Did the Victorian diplomat stationed in a remote post really make a clear
distinction between ‘oﬃcial ’ and ‘unoﬃcial ’ action and between ‘commercial ’ and ‘pol-
itical ’ concessions? [_] There was a large intermediate area which fell between what local
agents could do and what the foreign oﬃce would veto, ’ p. 547.
7 The policy of ‘non-intervention ’ was accompanied by another that defended the right to
‘protect British subjects and properties ’ abroad. In the midst of a civil conﬂict, determining
whether the British warships anchored in the region had to stick to the ‘non-intervention ’
ideal or act on the basis that British subjects and properties were at risk, was not always easy.
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intervention was enough, in many cases, to force Latin American govern-
ments to agree to British demands. It played down the real extent of Britain’s
interference in the domestic politics of Argentina, Brazil, Central America,
Chile and Uruguay.
It is, in fact, diﬃcult to ignore the extent to which British diplomats did
meddle in the politics of the River Plate region.8 According to James Scobie,
it was not until the uniﬁcation of Argentina in 1862 that British diplomats
became ‘observers of rather than mediators in the political scene’.9 The same
can be said for Brazil and Uruguay, where Britain’s use of gunboat diplomacy
was a regular feature before 1885.10 According to Miller, regarding Argentina
and Brazil in the 1840s : ‘diplomats, consuls and naval oﬃcers became deeply
involved in internal politics, in the Plate due to the chronic political instability
of Uruguay and Buenos Aires’ claims to control shipping on the river, and in
Brazil because of the slave trade. ’11 Moreover, John Mayo’s study of Anglo-
Chilean commercial relations (1851–86) suggests that the same could be said
for British involvement in Chile. Stephen Henry Sulivan, British charge´
d’aﬀaires and consul general in Chile (1850–53), ‘ endeavored both to be
neutral, and to keep Britons neutral ’.12 Nevertheless he ‘ followed a hard-line
policy that in the name of protecting British interests in practice gave
maximum support to the government, short of outright intervention’.13
Conﬁrmation of the view that gunboat diplomacy, political meddling and
economic pressure were far more common than is suggested by Platt14 may
be seen in Lord Palmerston’s openly expressed belief in teaching non-
compliant regimes a lesson. As he stated in 1850, when referring to China,
Portugal and South America, ‘ these half civilised governments [_] all
8 The British invasions of Montevideo and Buenos Aires (1806–1807) ; British diplomatic
intervention during the Argentine-Brazilian War (1825–28) ; the use of British warships oﬀ
the coast of Argentina, with the seizure of Las Malvinas in 1833 ; British military inter-
vention in the River Plate (1843–46), serve as examples of British involvement in the
region. In terms of the behaviour of the British diplomatic corps in Buenos Aires, John
Henry Mandeville who served as Minister Plenipotentiary in the Argentine Federation
(1836–45), was a notorious supporter of El Restaurador. The servility with which he treated
Juan Manuel de Rosas would be bitingly captured in Jose´ Ma´rmol’s classic romantic-
cum-political-thriller Amalia (1851).
9 James Scobie, ‘Los representantes brita´nicos y norteamericanos en la Argentina,
1852–1862, ’ Historia (Buenos Aires) 6 : 23, p. 166.
10 See Peter Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpu´rea. A la bu´squeda del imperio econo´mico (1806–1880)
(Montevideo, 1998), p. 42.
11 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 54.
12 John Mayo, British Merchants and Chilean Development 1851–1886 (Boulder & London, 1987),
p. 69. Mayo gives several examples of how Sulivan warned Britons in Chile to remain
neutral and that if they did not listen to his advice they would be responsible for their own
safety and would forfeit any claims upon their own government. See pp. 69–70.
13 Ibid., p. 72.
14 According to Platt, ‘For the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, the British impact on, and
inﬂuence in, Latin America is easily exaggerated, ’ Latin America and British Trade, p. 39.
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require a dressing down every eight to ten years to keep them in order. Their
minds are too shallow to receive any impression that will last longer than
some such period and warning is of little use. They care little for words and
they must not only see the stick but actually feel it on their shoulders ’.15
Although, the British Foreign Oﬃce did not support one government or
another openly,16 or ﬁnance rebellions or send its troops to the region in the
same fashion as did the USA,17 Miller reminds us that, ‘ to a Latin American
minister, with a knowledge of his own country’s history and events elsewhere,
the consuls’ power to summon cannons appeared a reality ’.18 As was ex-
pressed in an 1820 Spanish foreign policy survey, British foreign policy was
viewed with great mistrust, since ‘all that it lacks in good faith, it more than
makes up for in its mercantile spirit ’.19
Despite the doubts that have been raised about Platt’s interpretation, the
case of Mexico (c. 1821–c. 1855) would appear to substantiate the main tenets
of his standpoint. Miller’s view that ‘ the examples of [Richard] Pakenham in
Mexico, [Frederick] Chatﬁeld in Guatemala, or successive ministers in the
Plate [_] suggest that oﬃcials participated in domestic decision-making to a
much greater extent than their despatches to London imply ’, is inaccurate
regarding British political involvement in Mexico.20 The belief in non-
intervention, at least during the ﬁrst four national decades (1820–1860), was
strictly adhered to in the case of Mexico.21 Furthermore, in the 1820s and
15 Quoted in Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 51.
16 I am referring here to US interventionism in the region, which was far more forceful :
Mexican–American War (1846–48), William Walker’s intervention in Nicaragua (1855–56),
Hispano-Cuban-American War (1898), US occupation of Cuba (1898–1902), US inter-
vention in Panama (1903), US occupation of Puerto Rico (1898–), Nicaragua (1912–33),
Haiti (1915–34), Dominican Republic (1916–24).
17 The most striking exception is that of Frederick Chatﬁeld, whose activities as British
Consul in Central America (1837–52) led to the frequent use of gunboat diplomacy oﬀ the
Mosquito coast of Nicaragua. Chatﬁeld’s actions were atypical in the way that he openly
endeavoured to support Guatemala’s conservative caudillo Rafael Carrera. All dates of
years of service in the British diplomatic corps are taken from S. T. Bindoﬀ, E. F. Malcolm
Smith and C. K. Webster, British Diplomatic Representatives 1789–1852 (London, 1934).
18 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 59. As noted in Winn, Inglaterra y la Tierra Purpu´rea,
p. 43, ‘ la mayorı´a de las advertencias preventivas pretendı´an alertar a Montevideo que
Londres la responsabilizarı´a por cualquier dan˜o de los intereses brita´nicos y exigirı´a su
compensacio´n ’.
19 Quoted in Michael P. Costeloe, ‘Spain and the Latin American Wars of Independence : The
Free Trade Controversy, 1810–1821, ’ Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 61, no. 2
(1981), p. 233. 20 Miller, Britain and Latin America, p. 59.
21 As can be seen in Michael P. Costeloe, ‘The Extraordinary Case of Mr. Falconnet and
2,500,000 Silver Dollars : London and Mexico, 1850–1853, ’ Mexican Studies/Estudios
Mexicanos, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 261–89. Until the 1862 Tripartite Intervention,
the Foreign Oﬃce refused to back the claims of British bondholders and rejected pro-
posals for the use of force. See also Michael P. Costeloe, Bonds and Bondholders. British
Investors and Mexico’s Foreign Debt, 1824–1888 (Westport and London, 2003).
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1830s many British businessmen who had established themselves in Mexico
after independence shared the British diplomats’ view, that it was imperative
to observe the strictest neutrality in all internal aﬀairs.22 In the case of the
British-owned Real del Monte mining company, the enterprise’s executives
‘admonished members of the English staﬀ to conduct themselves properly,
to refrain from meddling in local or national politics, and to respect the
religion of the Mexicans ’. On two occasions in the late 1820s and once in
1834, when pronunciamientos were launched from the vicinity of Real del
Monte, ‘ the ﬁrm instructed staﬀ to remain politically neutral, ’ and to ‘ remain
quietly in their respective quarters ’ while the revolts took place.23 Discussing
the activities of the British consuls/merchants on Mexico’s West Coast
between 1821 and 1855, John Mayo concludes that the most successful were
those who despite their ‘conscious Britishness and occasional aggressive use
of [their] nationality, [_] depended more on accommodation to prevailing
circumstances than on changing them’.24
The story of Joseph Welsh certainly serves to conﬁrm Platt’s view. The
British charge´ d’aﬀaires and minister plenipotentiary in Mexico, Richard
Pakenham (1827–43), and his consul general, J. O’Gorman, wasted no time
in removing him from his role as vice consul in Veracruz the moment he
started to support Santa Anna’s revolt in January 1832. However, his story is
also worthy of study for the light it casts on Santa Anna. As I will show,
Welsh’s readiness to assist Santa Anna, the admiration he professed toward
the caudillo and his subsequently gained beneﬁts and status as one of Xalapa’s
more respected citizens oﬀer insights that help us understand Santa Anna’s
success as a politician, particularly in his home province of Veracruz.
Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna
The early national period was ﬁrst and foremost an ‘age of proposals ’. An
extensive range of ideological proposals was conjured up in a quest for a
legitimate constitutional framework that could both guarantee stability and
ensure an improvement in basic living conditions. The intensity that charac-
terised the political debate meant that this was as much an age of political
22 This is important since most diplomats were merchants/businessmen as well as consular
oﬃcials. See Platt, The Cinderella Service, p. 19. As noted by Mayo, with regard to Chile,
‘The ﬁrst consul general was appointed in 1823, together with two vice-consuls, and con-
sulates were opened at Coquimbo in 1824 and Concepcio´n in 1827. The appointment
of such essentially commercial oﬃcials as consuls indicated the British understanding of
the relations between the two countries, ’ British Merchants and Chilean Development, p. 8.
23 Robert W. Randall, ‘British Company and Mexican Community : The English at Real del
Monte, 1824–1849, ’ Business History Review, vol. 59 (Winter 1985), pp. 632–33; Robert W.
Randall, Real del Monte : A British Mining Venture in Mexico (Austin, 1972).
24 John Mayo, ‘Consuls and Silver Contraband on Mexico’s West Coast in the Era of Santa
Anna, ’ Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 19 (1987), p. 409.
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inquiry and experimentation.25 Nevertheless, the end of the colonial tie to
traditional monarchical authority opened up a vacuum that was occupied by
the military/regional strongmen/chieftains of the newly formed republics.26
Juan Manuel de Rosas, Andre´s de Santa Cruz, Francisco de Paula Santander,
Rafael Carrera, Dr Gaspar Rodrı´guez de Francia, Ramo´n Castilla, Fructuoso
Rivera and Jose´ Antonio Paez were all caudillos who came to power during
these years, sharing with Santa Anna a number of noteworthy qualities.
With the notable exception of Dr Francia, they were famous before they
rose to power because of their military prowess. Unlike the civilian politi-
cians who might have been more suitable for the presidency, they were
national heroes even before they moved into the national palace. Personality
cults, perpetuated in ﬁestas and ceremonies, further enhanced their popular
status.
Max Weber’s concept of ‘charismatic rule ’ or ‘charismatic domination’ is
worth recalling when considering caudillos like Santa Anna. The young
Spanish American republics underwent, to a greater or lesser extent, the kind
of turmoil and instability that resulted in a willingness on the part of the
community to trust inspired and inspiring individual leaders, rather than the
impersonal bureaucracy of legal (constitutional) authority :
The ‘natural ’ leaders in times of spiritual, physical, economic, ethical, religious or
political emergency were neither appointed oﬃcials nor trained and salaried
specialist ‘professionals ’ [_], but those who possessed speciﬁc physical and spiritual
gifts which were regarded as supernatural, in the sense of not being available to
everyone.27
Given that, ‘Charismatic domination in the ‘‘pure ’’ sense [_] is always the
oﬀspring of unusual circumstances – either external, especially political or
economic, or internal and spiritual, especially religious or both together. [And
that] it arises from the excitement felt by all members of a human group in an
extraordinary situation and from devotion to heroic qualities of whatever
kind, ’28 it may be helpful to view the caudillos’ appeal inWeberian terms. They
were ‘natural ’ leaders in a time of unusual circumstances and critical emerg-
encies. However, Weber also pointed out that once the emergency or con-
ﬂictive context that had given rise to the emergence of ‘charismatic rule ’ was
overcome, the unstable and destabilising nature of ‘charismatic domination’
led to its own demise. In other words, once the extraordinary situation that
produced the need for the ‘natural ’ leader ceased to be exist, devotion to
25 Will Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821–1853 (Westport, 1998) and Latin America
1800–2000, pp. 33–40.
26 John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America (Oxford, 1992) ; Franc¸ois-Xavier Guerra, Moder-
nidad e independencias. Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispa´nicas (Mexico City, 1993), pp. 150–162.
27 W. G. Runciman (ed.), Weber : Selections in Translation (Cambridge, 1978), p. 226.
28 Ibid., pp. 235–36.
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heroic qualities ended. Only if war or instability became chronic, for instance,
did the charismatic leader rise to become ruler on a more permanent basis.29
With most caudillos, the context in which they rose to power conforms to the
Weberian model, and once their appeal had faded few were able to rise again.
It is for this reason that Santa Anna remains one of the more enigmatic
caudillos of nineteenth-century Spanish America.
What continues to intrigue historians is Santa Anna’s unique ability to
return repeatedly to power, having suﬀered the kind of humiliating defeats
and political ﬁascos that would have ended the career of the most gifted
politicians. For Mark Wasserman, ‘The general was probably a political
genius. Otherwise, how can we account for his longevity and for his re-
markable comebacks? ’30 Born in Xalapa (21 February 1794),31 in the province
of Veracruz, Santa Anna joined the royalist army as a cadet in 1810. Like so
many creole oﬃcers, he embraced the cause of independence following the
proclamation of the Plan of Iguala in 1821, and was mainly responsible for
liberating his home province. Once independence was achieved, he led four
revolts (1822, 1823, 1828 and 1832) before being elected president of the
republic. Thereafter he was president on six diﬀerent occasions (1833–35,
1839, 1841–43, 1843–44, 1846–47 and 1853–55),32 although he preferred
to retire to his haciendas in Veracruz whenever he had the chance.33 His
military victories included repulsing a Spanish and a French invasion (1829
and 1838 respectively) and slaughtering the Texan rebels at the Alamo
(1836). His defeats included the battle of San Jacinto (1836), which led to the
independence of Texas, and the Mexican-American War (1846–48), whereby
Mexico lost half of its national territory. Often branded a traitor and a cynical
turncoat, Santa Anna’s political views evolved from upholding a liberal
agenda to supporting a conservative one as the diﬀerent constitutions failed
to give Mexico a stable political system. Exiled following his 1853–55 dic-
tatorship, Santa Anna tried to return to Mexico on two occasions before he
was allowed back in 1874. Having been one of the most inﬂuential caudillos
29 Ibid., p. 249.
30 Mark Wasserman, Everyday Life and Politics in Nineteenth Century Mexico. Men, Women, and War
(Albuquerque, 2000), p. 20.
31 Archivo Eclesia´stico de la Parroquia del Sagrario. Iglesia del Sagrado Corazo´n. Xalapa :
Caja [Bautizos] Num. 7, Vol. 21 [1792–1818], p. 9.
32 Those who count each time he returned to the capital to serve as president, come up
with the ﬁgure of eleven times president : 1. 16 May–3 June 1833 ; 2. 18 June–5 July 1833 ; 3.
27 October–15 December 1833; 4. 24 April 1834–27 January 1835; 5. 20 March–10 July
1839; 6. 10 October 1841–26 October 1842; 7. 4 March–4 October 1843 ; 8. 4 June–12
September 1844 ; 9. 21 March–2 April 1847 ; 10. 20 May–16 September 1847 ; 11. 20 April
1853–12 August 1855.
33 For a study on Santa Anna’s numerous properties in Veracruz see Will Fowler, ‘Las
propiedades veracruzanas de Santa Anna, ’ Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia
XLIII (2000), pp. 63–92.
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in Mexico at the height of his career, he died impoverished and forgotten in
Mexico City on 21 June 1876.34
Over the last twenty years, the historiography of independent Mexico has
made signiﬁcant progress towards providing a clearer understanding of the
period and, by default, of Santa Anna’s political success.35 As was noted
recently by Christon Archer, ‘ In some respects, it is quite remarkable that the
Mexican post-independence decades have taken so long to emerge. Although
we are still some distance from synthesis, [_] scholars [_] have posed the
right questions and created a solid foundation for future research ’.36 Joseﬁna
Va´zquez, albeit with reservations, agrees when she notes that, ‘ It is possible
that in a not too distant future we may have a more complete understanding
of these forgotten years ’.37 As regards Santa Anna, we can synthesise the
reasons for his political comebacks, resilience and longevity by highlighting
the following points. His personal corruption, notorious duplicity and alleged
lack of principle diﬀered little from that of many other successful generals
34 Although numerous biographies have been written about Santa Anna, the following con-
tinue to be the most commonly read to this day : W. H. Callcott, Santa Anna : The Story of an
Enigma Who Once Was Mexico (Norman, 1936) ; Fernando Dı´az Dı´az, Caudillos y caciques.
Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna y Juan A´lvarez (Mexico City, 1972) ; Jose´ Fuentes Mares, Santa
Anna : aurora y ocaso de un comediante (Mexico City, 1956) ; Enrique Gonza´lez Pedrero, Paı´s de
un solo hombre : el Me´xico de Santa Anna. Vol. 1 (Mexico City, 1993) ; Oakah L. Jones, Jr., Santa
Anna (New York, 1968) ; Rafael F. Mun˜oz, Santa Anna. El dictador resplandeciente (Mexico
City, 1983) ; Manuel Rivera Cambas, Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna (Mexico City, 1958) ;
Joseﬁna Zoraida Va´zquez, Don Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna. Mito y enigma (Mexico City,
1987) ; and Agustı´n Ya´n˜ez, Santa Anna. Espectro de una sociedad (Mexico City, 1982).
35 Worthy of mention are the following recent studies : Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico,
1821–1835 (Lincoln, NE, and London, 1998) ; Linda Arnold, Polı´tica y justicia. La suprema corte
mexicana (1824–1855) (Mexico City, 1996) ; Margaret Chowning, Wealth and Power in Provincial
Mexico. Michoaca´n from the Late Colony to the Revolution (Stanford, 1999) ; Michael P. Costeloe,
The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835–1846. Hombres de Bien in the Age of Santa Anna (Cam-
bridge, 1993) ; Torcuato S. Di Tella, National Popular Politics in Early Independent Mexico,
1820–1847 (Albuquerque, 1996) ; Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics and the Formation of
Mexico’s National State. Guerrero, 1800–1857 (Stanford, 1996) ; Elı´as Jose´ Palti (ed.), La polı´tica
del disenso. La ‘pole´mica en torno al monarquismo ’ (Me´xico, 1848–1850)_ y las aporı´as del liberalismo
(Mexico City, 1998) ; Humberto Morales and Will Fowler (eds.), El conservadurismo mexicano
en el siglo XIX (1810–1910) (Puebla, 1999) ; Pedro Santoni,Mexicans at Arms. Puro Federalists and
the Politics of War, 1845–1848 (Fort Worth, 1996) ; Laura Solares Robles,Una Revolucio´n Pacı´ﬁca.
Biografı´a polı´tica de Manuel Go´mez Pedraza, 1789–1851 (Mexico City, 1996) ; Reynaldo Sordo
Ceden˜o, El congreso en la primera repu´blica centralista (Mexico City, 1993) ; Donald F. Stevens,
Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (Durham, NC, 1991) ; Joseﬁna Zoraida
Va´zquez (ed.),Me´xico al tiempo de su guerra con Estados Unidos (1846–1848 ) (Mexico City, 1997) ;
Richard A. Warren, Vagrants and Citizens. Politics and the Masses in Mexico City from Colony to
Republic (Wilmington, 2001).
36 Christon I. Archer, ‘Discord, Disjunction, and Reveries of Past and Future Glories :
Mexico’s First Decades of Independence, 1810–1853, ’ Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos
16 : 1 (Winter 2000), p. 210.
37 Joseﬁna Zoraida Va´zquez, ‘Un viejo tema: el federalismo y el centralismo, ’ Historia
Mexicana XLII : 3 (1993), p. 628.
36 Will Fowler
and politicians. According to Fanny Caldero´n de la Barca, the Spanish
Ambassador’s Scottish wife, Santa Anna was ‘an acute general, active and
aspiring, whose name has a prestige, whether for good or for evil, that no
other possesses ’.38 The publicity given to his military victories certainly
served to keep him in the public mind as a warrior of Napoleonic stature.39
He successfully created a personality cult which, particularly in the army,
greatly increased his popularity. His fame as Liberator of Veracruz and Hero
of Tampico would appear to have struck a deeper chord in the collective
psyche of his contemporaries than the defeats he also participated in.
Certainly, his personal dynamism sharply contrasted with the inertia of ﬁg-
ures such as Anastasio Bustamante. In this sense, Santa Anna came across as
a man of action, always ready to abandon the National Palace or the pleasures
of his retirement to lead the troops into battle, whether it was against
domestic rebels or foreign aggressors. It was because of this dynamism that
he also represented autocratic power and a promise of stability, a halt to
what the hombres de bien feared most – social dissolution.
However, of greater importance was the fact that he was a supreme
manipulator, negotiator, and ﬁxer of deals behind the scenes. He always
generously rewarded those who supported him in the military, which was the
most important clientele he possessed.40 Likewise the merchant community
and the cotton lobby beneﬁted from his largesse and supported his rise to
power ﬁnancially. He was consistent in fulﬁlling pledges to those who
backed him.41 The support he received from the jarochos, his Veracruzan
38 Fanny Caldero´n de la Barca, Life in Mexico (London, 1987), p. 345.
39 See Will Fowler, ‘Fiestas santanistas : la celebracio´n de Santa Anna en la villa de Xalapa,
1821–1855, ’Historia Mexicana, vol. LII, no. 2 (Oct.–Dec. 2002), pp. 391–447; and both Will
Fowler, ‘Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna : ‘‘ el hombre visible por excelencia ’’ (Me´xico,
1821–1855), ’ and Vero´nica Za´rate Toscano, ‘He´roes y ﬁestas en el Me´xico decimono´nico:
la insistencia de Santa Anna, ’ in Manuel Chust and Vı´ctor Mı´nguez et al. (eds.), La
construccio´n del he´roe en Espan˜a y Me´xico, 1789–1847 (Castello´n, 2004).
40 Carmen Va´zquez Manteco´n, Santa Anna y la encrucijada del estado : la dictadura (1853–1855)
(Mexico City, 1986), pp. 25–6 ; Fernando Dı´az Dı´az, Caudillos y caciques : Antonio Lo´pez de
Santa Anna y Juan A´lvarez (Mexico City, 1972), p. 151 ; Will Fowler, Military Political Identity
and Reformism in Independent Mexico. An analysis of the Memorias de Guerra (1821–1855)
(London, 1996).
41 See Michael P. Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico, pp. 185–92. For Santa Anna’s
relations with the merchant community and the cotton lobby, although more research
remains to be done, the following studies oﬀer some very valuable insights : Carmen
Bla´zquez Domı´nguez, Polı´ticos y comerciantes en Veracruz y Xalapa 1827–1829 (Xalapa, 1992) ;
Michael P. Costeloe, ‘The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Busta-
mante, August–October 1841, ’ Journal of Latin American Studies, 20 (1988), pp. 337–60 ;
Guadalupe Jime´nez Codinach, ‘Veracruz, almace´n de plata en el Atla´ntico : La casa
Gordon y Murphy, 1805–1824, ’ Historia Mexicana, 38 : 2 (1988), pp. 325–53; Barbara A.
Tenenbaum, ‘Merchants, Money and Mischief, ’ The Americas, 25 (1979), pp. 317–39, and
also Me´xico en la e´poca de los agiotistas, 1821–1857 (Mexico City, 1985) ; Guy P. C. Thompson,
Puebla de los A´ngeles. Industry and Society in a Mexican City, 1700–1850 (Boulder, 1989).
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followers, was also a key asset when he needed political and, especially,
military backing. He targeted his patronage carefully and consolidated a
group of identiﬁable santanistas.42 He relied on the upper classes, the hombres
de bien 43 and the gente de orden, but was also capable of projecting himself as a
man of the people to the masses.44
Santa Anna had his ears open to public opinion and knew when it was
time to take advantage of his enemies’ political diﬃculties. He succeeded in
creating the notion that Mexico’s troubles were to be blamed on political
parties that divided the nation and created a need for reconciliation. He also
succeeded in appearing to the eyes of many as the great arbitrator of the
nation who intervened to protect the people against misgovernment, whether
it was under a radical, moderate or traditionalist administration. In this sense,
Santa Anna used and was used by the constitutional politicians of the ‘age of
proposals ’. The fact that he did not subscribe to any party-based ideology,
believing himself superior to all, meant that he came to be ‘ the temptation of
all parties ’. Most factions and parties believed that they could use him to rise
to power.45 His charisma and the cult of his persona made him an indis-
pensable player. His absenteeism and his detachment from the party politics
of the capital also meant that he could return time and again, posing as the
great arbitrator of Mexico’s divisions. This, in turn, made most parties be-
lieve that Santa Anna could be used for their own cause, as long as he was
kept happy, and so his support was sought by most of the factions at one
point or another during the period.46
Recent research has also shown that Santa Anna’s loyal friend Jose´ Marı´a
Tornel yMendı´vil played a key role in orchestrating the caudillo’s repeated rise
to power. Tornel was Santa Anna’s informer in the capital, his leading
propagandist and his master intriguer. Without him Santa Anna would not
have been as well informed as he was about events in the capital on those
occasions he retired to his hacienda or was away in exile. Likewise, Santa
42 Dı´az Dı´az, Caudillos y caciques, pp. 151–53; Will Fowler, ‘El pensamiento polı´tico de los
santanistas, 1821–1855, ’ in Luis Ja´uregui and Jose´ Antonio Serrano Ortega (eds.), Historia y
nacio´n II. Polı´tica y diplomacia en el siglo XIX mexicano (Mexico City, 1998), pp. 183–226; Will
Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821–1853 (Westport, 1998), pp. 219–63.
43 For a deﬁnition/typology of the hombre de bien see Michael P. Costeloe, ‘Hombres de bien in
the Age of Santa Anna, ’ in Jaime E. Rodrı´guez O. (ed.), Mexico in the Age of Democratic
Revolutions, 1750–1850 (Boulder & London, 1994), pp. 243–57.
44 The importance of the popular classes and the need most politicians had to engage with
them, one way or another, is amply demonstrated in : Richard A. Warren, Vagrants and
Citizens. Politics and the Masses in Mexico City from Colony to Republic (Wilmington, 2001)
and Torcuato S. Di Tella, National Popular Politics in Early Independent Mexico, 1820–1847
(Albuquerque, 1996). 45 John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800–1850, pp. 316–64.
46 Will Fowler, ‘The Repeated Rise of General Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna in the So-
Called Age of Chaos (Mexico, 1821–55), ’ in Will Fowler (ed.), Authoritarianism in Latin
America Since Independence (Westport, 1996), pp. 1–30.
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Anna would not have acquired such notoriety and prestige, recovering in the
process from such major disasters as the 1836 Texan campaign and the 1847
debacle, had it not been for Tornel’s eulogies to the caudillo. And it would
have been very diﬃcult for Santa Anna, from Veracruz, to organise the
concerted pronunciamientos of 1834, 1841, and 1842, without the invaluable
help of Tornel, who provided the santanistas with their anti-party, antipolitics,
nationalist ideology. It was Tornel, as Santa Anna’s minister of war, who
ensured that the regular army became a predominantly santanista institution
and he was equally instrumental in giving santanismo a strong populist slant
through his exertions in the ﬁeld of education. While Santa Anna appeared to
be mainly preoccupied with ensuring that he was in control of his home
province of Veracruz, it was Tornel who gave the caudillo a voice in national
politics by consistently representing his interests in the capital (with the
exception of their years of estrangement, 1844–47).47
Most British diplomats in Mexico viewed Santa Anna as the most capable
ruler in Mexico at the time. Richard Pakenham, although weary of Santa
Anna, was convinced that no other general or politician could manage the
country as well : ‘General Santa Anna’s activity and energy always impart a
degree of vigour to the Government unknown under other circumstances. ’48
In 1853, Percy Doyle stated in no uncertain terms that it was to ‘be hoped
that General Santa Anna will come shortly ’ back from exile, for he knew ‘of
no men of suﬃcient weight ’ capable of restoring order in the country.49 The
only British plenipotentiary who was consistently critical of Santa Anna was
Charles Bankhead, who accused him of ‘a total disregard of public opinion
and interests – and a systematic determination to feed on the resources of
the country for his own beneﬁt ’.50 Even then, Bankhead was prepared to
state that, ‘ If General Santa Anna had shown in latter times some compunc-
tion for the real wants and interests of his country [_] he might have been
one of the most powerful men that any of these Republics have produced.
His knowledge of his countrymen was unbounded, and he might have ruled
them for his own and their advantage ’.51 The case of Joseph Welsh is
interesting since he took his admiration of the caudillo one step further than
his contemporaries in the diplomatic corps. He was to be the only British
47 Will Fowler, Tornel and Santa Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, Mexico 1795–1853 (Westport,
2000). For Tornel also see, Marı´a del Carmen Va´zquez Manteco´n, La palabra del poder. Vida
pu´blica de Jose´ Marı´a Tornel (1795–1853) (Mexico City, 1997).
48 Public Record Oﬃce (henceforth referred to as PRO), Foreign Oﬃce Papers (henceforth
referred to as FO) 50/161, f. 80, Richard Pakenham to Lord Aberdeen, Mexico City,
22 March 1843.
49 PRO: FO 50/259, ﬀ. 48–51 : Percy Doyle to Lord John Russell, Mexico City, 4 March 1853.
50 PRO: FO 50/177, ﬀ. 147–58: Charles Bankhead to Lord Aberdeen, Mexico City, 31 Dec.
1844.
51 PRO: FO 50/184, ﬀ. 1–7 : Charles Bankhead to Lord Aberdeen, Mexico City, 29 Jan. 1845.
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diplomat to support Santa Anna openly during these years and the only one
to lose his job for interfering in Mexican national politics.
Joseph Welsh’s story
Joseph Welsh was an Irish Protestant born in 1805.52 He arrived in Veracruz
in the mid-1820s with his elder brother John, who was named vice consul at
Veracruz following the resignation of his predecessor in October 1826.53
When John had to return to England ‘on urgent private business ’ in the
summer of 1827, Charles Dashwood, the consul in Veracruz, based in
Xalapa, decided to appoint Joseph to act as vice consul during his brother’s
absence. At the time, as Dashwood was prepared to note, Joseph Welsh
‘ is fully competent to conduct the duties of the oﬃce having been with his
brother ever since he has held the situation of Vice Consul ’.54 Although the
reasons behind John Welsh’s failure to return are unknown, his permanent
departure led to Joseph retaining the post of vice consul until he was formally
forced to vacate his post in the diplomatic corps in 1832.
Welsh was not a santanista to begin with. The ﬁrst time he wrote about the
incipient caudillo was in a report on the revolt Santa Anna led against the
election of General Manuel Go´mez Pedraza to the presidency in September
1828. Mirroring the views of many Mexicans and particularly veracruzanos at
the time, who remained, uncertain about Santa Anna’s intentions,55 Welsh
expressed the hope that the government forces would win and that ‘ this
rebellion will very soon be at an end’.56 Welsh was, however, already aware
that Santa Anna’s inﬂuence among the popular classes could not be ignored.
Speaking about the situation in the port of Veracruz, Welsh feared that
although ‘every conﬁdence is placed in Colonel [Manuel] Rinco´n ’, he was
‘not suﬃciently supported’.57 Nevertheless, Welsh did not interfere in the
political situation, and earned the praise of the Foreign Oﬃce, which noted
52 Archivo Notarial Biblioteca Central Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa (henceforth referred
to as ANBUV) : ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de
1848, ’ ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
53 PRO: FO 50/28, ﬀ. 33–36 : John Bidwell to Charles Dashwood, Veracruz, 31 Oct. 1826.
54 PRO: FO 50/39, ﬀ. 114–15: Charles Dashwood to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 30 July 1827.
55 This in part was due to the fact that there was a greater degree of ambiguity about Santa
Anna’s political stance at the time than usual. In essence, whilst Santa Anna supported
Vicente Guerrero and the yorkinos at a national level, his sympathies lay with Miguel
Barraga´n and the escoceses at the regional level. See Carmen Bla´zquez Domı´nguez, Polı´ticos y
comerciantes en Veracruz y Xalapa 1827–1829 (Xalapa, 1992) and Will Fowler, Tornel and Santa
Anna. The Writer and the Caudillo, Mexico 1795–1853 (Westport, 2000), pp. 70–1. Santa Anna
was not yet, in the late 1820s, the powerful hacendado he was to become in subsequent years,
controlling a vast area of the province, thus consolidating through patronage the undying
support the jarochos would grant him for the remainder of his political career.
56 PRO: FO 50/50, ﬀ. 191–92 : Joseph Welsh to John Backhouse, Veracruz, 4 Oct. 1828.
57 PRO: FO 203/30, ﬀ. 194–95: Joseph Welsh to J. O’Gorman, Veracruz, 20 Sept. 1828.
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in one document that, ‘his Lordship approves of Vice Consul Welsh’s
conduct ’.58
Of course, the revolt Santa Anna instigated in September 1828 was ulti-
mately successful. Whilst Santa Anna was pursued by government forces
from Perote to Oaxaca during the autumn of 1828, the revolt of the La
Acordada barracks in Mexico City (30 November 1828) forced Go´mez
Pedraza into exile and placed Vicente Guerrero in the presidential seat.
Despite the fact that the radical yorkinos’ 1828 victory cannot be attributed to
Santa Anna’s actions alone, there existed the perception that it had been he
who had set the ball rolling. Until 1832, Santa Anna’s pronunciamientos were
perceived as having initiated major shifts and changes that the majority
appeared to want to embrace. A closer analysis of the events themselves
demonstrates that such a perception does not stand up to examination.
Nevertheless, as can be evidenced in the writings of inﬂuential santanistas
such as Jose´ Marı´a Tornel, Jose´ Marı´a Bocanegra or Juan Su´arez y Navarro,
this inﬂuential view existed and was shared by other onlookers, some of
whom were not necessarily close to him.59 Representative of the perception
is Lucas Alama´n’s assertion that, ‘ the History of Mexico [from 1821 on-
wards] [_] could be rightly called the History of Santa Anna’s revolutions ’.
60
The US minister, Waddy Thompson, similarly believed that, ‘No history of
his country for that period can be written without the constant mention of
his name; indeed, I regard him, as more than any other man, the author and
ﬁnisher of the last and successful struggle of Mexico for independence and a
Republican form of government ’.61 For many, Santa Anna was not an
opportunistic turncoat, but the man who had sparked oﬀ the most signiﬁcant
transformations Mexico’s political system had experienced during the ﬁrst
national decade. The fall of Agustı´n de Iturbide and the subsequent re-
publican proposal had come about in the aftermath of his Plan of Veracruz
(2 December 1822).62 The adoption of a federal constitution in 1824 had
likewise succeeded his Plan of San Luis Potosı´ (5 June 1823). And it was
Santa Anna who ﬁrst rebelled in Perote (12 September 1828) against those
electoral results that the majority had deemed to be an inaccurate interpret-
ation of the will of the people. Thereafter, and prior to his major revolt of
58 PRO: FO 50/50: Unsigned draft of letter dated 3 Nov. 1828.
59 See Jose´ Marı´a Tornel, Breve resen˜a histo´rica de los acontecimientos ma´s notables de la nacio´n mexicana
desde el an˜o de 1821 hasta nuestros dı´as (Mexico City, 1985) ; Jose´ Marı´a Bocanegra,Memorias para
la historia de Me´xico independiente, 1822–1846. 3 vols. (Mexico City, 1987) ; and Juan Sua´rez y
Navarro, Historia de Me´xico y del general Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna : comprende los aconteci-
mientos polı´ticos que han tenido lugar en la nacio´n, desde el an˜o de 1821 hasta 1848. 2 vols. (Mexico City,
1850–51). 60 Lucas Alama´n, Historia de Me´jico. Vol. V (Mexico City, 1986), p. 396.
61 Waddy Thompson, Recollections of Mexico (New York and London, 1847), pp. 54–5.
62 See Will Fowler y Juan Ortiz Escamilla, ‘La revuelta del 2 de diciembre de 1822 : una
perspectiva regional, ’ Historias, 47 (2000), pp. 19–37.
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1832, his prestige had grown even further. It can safely be said that after the
glorious victory of Tampico (11 September 1829) over a Spanish expedition
that arrived from Cuba with the intention of re-conquering Mexico, he had
become the most highly praised general of the period. In the meantime,
Welsh had married the veracruzana Marı´a del Carmen Baro´n, in Veracruz, in
1829, at the age of 24.63 It would appear that they married for love since
neither he nor she contributed any capital to the alliance.64 Whilst there is no
evidence that Marı´a del Carmen played a major role in inspiring Welsh to
become a santanista, the fact that he had been married to a veracruzana for
three years by the time of the 1832 Revolt cannot be entirely overlooked.65
Likewise, it is tempting to attribute his actions to the impetuousness of youth,
since Welsh was only 26 when he became involved in the conﬂict. Never-
theless, the 1832 revolt was indeed popular, especially from the perspective
of Veracruz.
Although this is not the place to discuss the origins of the 1832 revolt66 or
why it was to become, in a sense, the bloodiest civil war to erupt in Mexico
between 1821 and 1854,67 some points are worth highlighting to provide
63 ANBUV: ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de 1848, ’
ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
64 ANBUV: ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de 1848, ’
ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
65 A paper, to be published in Will Fowler (ed.), Presidentes mexicanos (Mexico City, forth-
coming), highlights the subtle yet inﬂuential role played by women in nineteenth-century
Mexico : Anne Staples, ‘Las mujeres detra´s de los presidentes, ’ Paper given in the Sym-
posium on ‘Mexican Presidents, ’ Annual Conference of the Society for Latin American
Studies, University of Birmingham, 6–8 April 2001.
66 See Michael P. Costeloe, La primera repu´blica federal de Me´xico (1824–1835) (Mexico City, 1983),
pp. 327–49; Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico, 1821–1835 (Lincoln, NE, 1998), pp. 246–68;
Will Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821–1853 (Westport, 1998), pp. 21–2, 229–31;
Frank Samponaro, ‘La alianza de Santa Anna y los federalistas, 1832–1834. Su formacio´n y
desintegracio´n, ’ Historia Mexicana 30 : 3 (1981), pp. 359–80; Jaime E. Rodrı´guez O., ‘The
Origins of the 1832 Rebellion, ’ and Joseﬁna Zoraida Va´zquez, ‘Los pronunciamientos de
1832 : aspirantismo polı´tico e ideologı´a, ’ both in Jaime E. Rodrı´guez O. (ed.), Patterns of
Contention in Mexican History (Wilmington, 1992), pp. 145–62, 163–86 respectively.
67 See Will Fowler, ‘Civil Conﬂict in Independent Mexico, 1821–57 : An Overview, ’ in Re-
becca Earle (ed.), Rumours of Wars : Civil Conﬂict in Nineteenth-Century Latin America (London,
2000), pp. 49–86. Whilst there were literally thousands of pronunciamientos between 1821 and
1854, and some regional revolts were indeed bloody, with social and ethnic tensions run-
ning high (e.g., Vicente Guerrero’s 1831 revolt [see Peter F. Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and
the Formation of Mexico’s National State. Guerrero, 1800–1857 (Stanford, 1996), pp. 130–36], or
the caste war in Yucata´n (1847–52) [see Nelson Reed, La guerra de castas de Yucata´n (Mexico
City, 1987)] ; the only national civil war to have erupted between the War of Independence
(1810–21) and the Revolution of Ayutla (1854–55), with full-scale pitched battles (in Ver-
acruz, San Luis Potosı´ and Puebla) and a particularly high death-toll, was the 1832 Feder-
alist Civil War. The intensity and scope of the violence is amply documented in the Archivo
Histo´rico de la Secretarı´a de la Defensa Nacional [henceforth referred to as AHSDN]:
Expedientes XI/481.3/775–821, XI/481.3/834–835, XI/481.3/839, XI/481.3/843, XI/
481.3/885, XI/481.3/912–915, XI/481.3/936, XI/481.3/944–946, XI/481.3/960–1004.
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a background for Joseph Welsh’s actions. From 1830 to 1832, what became
known as the party of order (el partido del orden) had taken over the reins of
government. Under the guidance of Lucas Alama´n, General Anastasio
Bustamante’s government began to implement constitutional reforms that
curtailed the power of the federal states and limited the universality of male
suﬀrage to more clearly deﬁned property-owning citizens. Several attempts
were made to inject new life into the Mexican economy through the creation
of a bank, the Banco de Avı´o (16 October 1830),68 and promises of assisting
Mexico’s dormant industry with protectionist policies.69 The economic suc-
cess of the administration’s policies was actually fairly impressive. According
to Michael Costeloe, ‘Peace and order, honest and eﬀective public accounts,
power in the hands of the hombres de bien ; had all combined to produce the
prosperity and economic progress the [1829] rebels of Xalapa had hoped to
achieve ’.70 Conﬁdence in the Mexican economy was restored, and the British
bondholders who had contributed to the loans of the mid-1820s were
prepared to renegotiate the terms of repayment.71 Although Alama´n’s
protectionist inclinations may have given rise to concern within the British
merchant community with their reliance on free trade, the improved econ-
omic outlook was more important. The re-negotiation of the British loan in
itself indicates that British interests were being well-served by the Bustamante
administration, and that the merchant community, including the enlarged
British merchant community in Veracruz, did not have strong grounds to
consider overthrowing the regime a necessarily desirable objective.72 The
rescheduling of the foreign debt in 1831 resulted in the resumption of the
payment of dividends for the ﬁrst time since the default in 1827. London
bondholders, consequently, for the ﬁrst time for several years, received their
68 See Robert A. Potash, Mexican Government and Industrial Development in the Early Republic : The
Banco de Avı´o (Amherst, 1983). Also see Barbara A. Tenenbaum, Me´xico en la e´poca de los
agiotistas, 1821–1857 (Mexico City, 1985), pp. 57–62.
69 Alama´n’s concern with industrialising Mexico found expression under the Bustamante
government with the encouragement and emergence of a silk factory in Guanajuato, an
iron smelting factory in Cuautla, textile factories in Puebla and Tlalpan, and a wool factory
in Quere´taro. See Catherine Andrews, ‘The military and political career of General
Anastasio Bustamante, 1780–1853, ’ unpubl. PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2001,
p. 154. 70 Costeloe, La primera repu´blica federal, pp. 304–5.
71 Andrews, ‘The political and military career of General Anastasio Bustamante, ’ p. 152. The
debt increased, as a result, from $26,407,000 to $36,329,100. See Costeloe, Bonds and
Bondholders, pp. 27–32.
72 The British merchant community in Veracruz replaced the Spanish one in economic im-
portance following the impact the expulsion laws of 1827 had in the region. See Jackie R.
Booker, Veracruz Merchants, 1770–1829. A Mercantile Elite in Late Bourbon and Early Independent
Mexico (Boulder, 1993) ; Michael P. Costeloe, ‘Barcelona Merchants and the Latin American
Wars of Independence, ’ The Americas 38 : 2 (October 1982), pp. 431–48; Harold Dana Sims,
The Expulsion of Mexico’s Spaniards, 1821–1836 (Pittsburgh, 1990) ; and Carmen Bla´zquez
Domı´nguez, Polı´ticos y comerciantes en Veracruz y Xalapa 1827–1829.
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dividends throughout 1832.73 However, Bustamante’s government soon be-
came characterised by its autocratic nature, as evidenced both by the forced
closure of any critical newspapers and the repression of the deposed Vicente
Guerrero’s rebellion in the south (1830–31).74 The tide of opinion turned
against Bustamante’s government when it authorised the execution of
Guerrero (14 February 1831), and after the treacherous way he was taken
prisoner became public knowledge.75 The execution of a high-ranking oﬃcer
who was also an ex-president turned the majority of those moderates who had
previously supported the party of order against Bustamante’s government.
From as early as 1829 it was clear that Santa Anna did not sympathise with
the party of order. When the Plan of Xalapa (4 December 1829) that led to
Guerrero’s overthrow was launched, Santa Anna stood by Guerrero. There-
after, although he was approached on several occasions by Bustamante’s
administration, he maintained a signiﬁcant distance from the government,
retreating to his hacienda Manga de Clavo. It was only after Jose´ Marı´a
Tornel returned from the United States in late 1831, that Santa Anna, making
the most of the government’s increasing unpopularity, ﬁnally came out into
the open and led the 2 January pronunciamiento of Veracruz. As was the case
with most of the plans led by Santa Anna, the Plan of Veracruz was drafted
and written by other high-ranking oﬃcers who invited him to come to their
aid. As was recorded by Welsh, ‘Yesterday several oﬃcers of the garrison
waited upon General Santa Anna at Manga de Clavo to persuade him to put
himself at the head of a party to declare against the present ministry, they laid
their plans before him, of which he approved and consented to head the
pronunciamiento ’.76
The Plan of Veracruz stated that (1) it was the rebels’ intention to support
the federal constitution; (2) it was imperative that Bustamante renew his
cabinet, since it was dominated by centralists and responsible for tolerating
unforgivable crimes against the country’s civil rights and liberties ; (3) Santa
Anna would be oﬀered the leadership of the revolt ; and (4) the authors of
the plan would cease to be responsible for the rebels’ actions the moment
73 It is for all of this that Welsh’s conduct is more perplexing given that he was the Veracruz
commissioner for the London bondholders. As such – he was appointed in late 1830 as
part of the rescheduling agreement – he was paid a commission on the dividend money
remitted to London in 1832. Therefore, the fact that he was prepared to support Santa
Anna, as will be discussed further on, cannot be explained in purely economic terms.
Michael P. Costeloe, private communication, 8 Nov. 2002. See as well Costeloe, Bonds and
Bondholders, p. 117.
74 For a discussion of the censorship the press was subjected to under the Bustamante
administration (1830–32), see Jaime E. Rodrı´guez O., El nacimiento de Hispanoame´rica. Vicente
Rocafuerte y el hispanoamericanismo, 1808–1832 (Mexico City, 1980), pp. 275–97.
75 For Vicente Guerrero avoid reading Theodore G. Vincent, The Legacy of Vicente Guerrero,
Mexico’s First Black Indian President (Gainesville, 2001).
76 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 17 : Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 3 Jan. 1832.
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Santa Anna took over the revolt (which he did the following day).77 As Welsh
noted on 4 January : ‘General Santa Anna entered this city yesterday at 6 pm
in a chaise and six accompanied by the Colonel of the 2nd and 9th Regiment
and escorted by a captain guard of Dragoons amid the universal acclamations
of the People ! ’78
Welsh’s letter of 4 January testiﬁes to the popularity Santa Anna enjoyed in
Veracruz : ‘He drove to the Palace where he was received by a detachment of
the 2nd Regiment, Military and Civilian authorities with Bands of Music and
co. ; so great was the enthusiasm manifested in favour of the cause which he
has been called to espouse that it was late before he could attend his oﬃcial
duties ’. It highlights the characteristic care Santa Anna would take to ensure
his troops were well-behaved and that no harm came to the commercial
establishments in the port : ‘before he retired to rest he took the necessary
precaution to ensure tranquillity and to inform my colleagues and self of the
object he and his companions have in view; in which it is believed they are
most sincere ’. It shows how Santa Anna made a point of keeping key players
in the business community informed of his movements and intentions and
how he persuaded them that he was less concerned with power than the
aspirations of the people : ‘privately he has informed that as soon as the
agitation experienced by the States is quieted and a conﬁdential ministry
installed to the satisfaction of his countrymen he shall lose no time in re-
turning to his farm’. The letter also shows that he ensured his troops’ loyalty
through the regular payment of their salaries : ‘ the troops, 1000 men, have
been reviewed and paid to date, the fortiﬁcations of the city and castle are
being put in order to resist any attack, Puente is taken possession of and will
be fortiﬁed and expresses are being dispatched in every quarter ’.
Welsh was conﬁdent that the revolt would triumph and that its cause had
widespread support in the mainland: ‘ I have good reasons to believe that the
whole coast will ﬂy to arms so that with the co-operation already arranged
with other States and consequent desertions of troops, the Government
cannot resist the now almost general outcry against the present adminis-
tration. ’79 It is worth noting here that Timothy Anna’s view that Santa Anna
‘ favored a moderate approach’ initially, and that he was hoping a change of
cabinet would pacify the growing unrest,80 preventing the conﬂict from
77 The Plan of Veracruz is reprinted in Jose´ Marı´a Bocanegra,Memorias para la historia de Me´xico
independiente, 1822–1846, vol. 2 (Mexico City, 1987), pp. 265–68.
78 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 18, Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832.
79 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 18, Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832.
80 Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico, p. 247. Also see the correspondence between Santa Anna
and Anastasio Bustamante which conﬁrms this in Nettie Lee Benson Latin American
Collection, University of Texas at Austin, Mariano Riva Palacio Archive : No. 202: Santa
Anna to Anastasio Bustamante, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832; No. 203: Santa Anna to Anastasio
Bustamante, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832 ; No. 204: Santa Anna to Anastasio Bustamante,
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escalating, is conﬁrmed in Welsh’s letter : ‘notwithstanding this hostile
appearance on the part of Santa Anna he writes oﬃcially and privately in
such a manner to the Ministers as he ﬂatters himself will induce them to
retire quietly and prevent the eﬀusion of blood! ’ The letter ended with a
warning which, although ironic, was more probably written as a means to
protect himself from allegations he anticipated, given that his sympathies
were already strongly with Santa Anna’s camp: ‘I shall continue to search for
and communicate to you the most correct information which I can possibly
obtain, taking care at the same time to abstain from any interference in the political
agitations of the country which I know to be inconsistent with my situation ; I make this
observation lest the steps which I take to obtain information should be
reported to you in an incorrect manner ’.81
Welsh’s support of the revolt was made clearer in his letter of the following
day, in which he stated that Bustamante’s administration was attempting to
overthrow the Federal Constitution:82 ‘ the present political agitations in this
quarter, [_] will, in my humble opinion, spread throughout the country as
there is little doubt that the present administration has been working to
overturn the federal system! ! ’ The fact that Santa Anna had ensured that,
‘ In this city perfect tranquillity continues to reign and I fully expect will
continue, ’83 made supporting the revolt all the easier from his perspective as
British Vice Consul.
Welsh’s partisan view of the conﬂict became even more obvious both in
his celebration of the revolt’s popular appeal in the region, and in his
assertion that Bustamante’s ministers had to resign in order to solve Mexico’s
increasing problems:
The news was received in Jalapa with universal acclamations and 250 men who had
marched to Encero were obliged to return to keep the city quiet, so great was the
enthusiasm of the people ! Part of the troops have deserted from Colonel [Manuel]
Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832 ; No. 205 : Anastasio Bustamante to Santa Anna, Mexico City, 12 Jan.
1832 ; No. 206: Santa Anna to Bustamante, Veracruz, 25 Jan. 1832.
81 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 18, Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832. My
emphasis.
82 The accusation employed by the rebels to overthrow Bustamante’s administration, was
nonetheless inaccurate. As several studies have shown, Bustamante’s administration did
not attempt to impose a centralist system. This was simply a very powerful and eﬀective
piece of propaganda the federalist, ex-yorkino factions employed. See Joseﬁna Zoraida
Va´zquez, ‘ Iglesia, eje´rcito y centralismo, ’ Historia Mexicana 39 : 1 (1989), pp. 205–34; Will
Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals, pp. 56–7 ; Catherine Andrews, ‘The military and
political career of General Anastasio Bustamante ’. Having said this, Peter Guardino be-
lieves that although ‘Va´zquez is undoubtedly correct [_] [t]he regime was never able to
leave behind the image it presented in early 1830 as it dissolved state governments and
replaced them with its supporters ’ : see Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of
Mexico’s National State, p. 135.
83 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 15 : Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 5 Jan. 1832.
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Gamboa and arrived here ; they state that others will follow. The Plan has been
seconded in Alvarado and other parts of the coast [_] Since the 4th upwards of 400
old soldiers have volunteered their services here to Santa Anna and at Puente
Colonel [Mariano] Cenobio and all the country people are rising ! ! ! It is sincerely to
be hoped that the present ministry will see the necessity of resigning otherwise
serious disturbances are to be dreaded throughout the country !84
His letter of 11 January developed this view further. His enthusiastic cel-
ebration of the support for Santa Anna would be presented alongside a
somewhat scornful description of the state the government forces found
themselves in :
on the 8th instant, 50 Infantry came in from Alvarado; about 70 cavalry and a
further party of infantry are hourly expected from the same place, the militia have
remained subject to Santa Anna’s order. A Circular has been issued by Santa Anna
ordering the country militia to be put under arms ; there appears to be a great
readiness to comply with this order. In Huatepeque 200 infantry and 100 cavalry are
promised by the authorities [_] Yesterday 30 Infantry came by sea from Tuxpan
and 60 to 70 cavalry are expected every hour. At Puente Colonel Cenobio has now
250 infantry and 150 cavalry, besides as many more which he can raise in a day. [_]
The news of General [ Jose´ Marı´a] Caldero´n’s march from Orizaba to Jalapa arrived
yesterday, it appears that only about 300 men of the cantonment followed him [_]
There are further desertions from Jalapa, last night several oﬃcers arrived, the
troops of Tres Villas they say will not ﬁght against Santa Anna [_] Since the 8th
instant this garrison has been declared to be in a state of campaign, the batteries are
all manned and sentries placed in every direction [_] Tomorrow and next day the
troops will be publicly reviewed by Santa Anna in person.85
Moreover, Welsh was pleased that Santa Anna was openly prepared to
safeguard British interests ; ‘ I have much pleasure in informing you that my
commercial establishment has this day received $139.160 on this account to
be shipped. [_] Perfect tranquillity reigns here and trade is going on as
usual ’.86 Santa Anna was ‘promising not to take any step to the discredit of
his country ! ’87
Whilst Welsh’s enthusiasm for Santa Anna’s cause must have already
started to trouble Pakenham, it was his letter of 31 January 1832 that
demonstrated that he was willing to take up arms and join the rebels. It
remains unclear if Welsh’s justiﬁcation for entering the fray was based on the
truth. Richard Pakenham certainly refused to believe that the government
forces had received the direct order to bombard and pillage Veracruz.88 Yet,
whether it was simply a pretext for Welsh to support Santa Anna or whether
the news of General Antonio Gaona’s intentions ﬁnally pushed Welsh into
84 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 25–6 : Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 7 Jan. 1832.
85 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 27–9 : Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 11 Jan. 1832.
86 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 27–9 : Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 11 Jan. 1832.
87 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 29–30: Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 11 Jan. 1832.
88 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 57–8: Richard Pakenham to Joseph Welsh, Mexico City, 6 Feb. 1832.
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adopting a combative stance, by the end of January, Welsh was prepared
to ﬁght for the santanistas. The letter is worth quoting extensively for what
it tells us about Welsh’s perception of the events and the veracruzano
perspective of the conﬂict :
on the 29th instant General Santa Anna discovered, through the medium of several
oﬃcers whom the present Minister of War has endeavoured to seduce, a plan for the
taking of the city, by which the lives of His Majesty’s subjects would have been
placed in imminent danger and their property exposed to ﬁre and plunder [_]. I am
convinced that the blood of every honest man must chill within his veins on hearing
such a proceeding not surpassed by the most cruel and barbarous of enemies and in
direct opposition to the principles of warfare among People who have the least title
of civilisation ! ! And yet this plan has been laid by the Minister of War of Mexico,
with whose government Great Britain holds a treaty, by which guarantees have been
given to her subjects ! ! I should not have lost a moment in communicating to you
this horrible plan [_], but I deferred [_] until [_] I had seen the original docu-
ments [_] No doubt was left on my mind of the danger from which we have so
narrowly escaped; danger plotted not by the dissident chief or his party, but by the
Government who should have been the last to take such a step ! ! [_] If therefore an
attempt should be made, the Mexican government must not be surprised to ﬁnd those who should
otherwise have observed perfect neutrality, take up arms in defence of their lives and property ! [_]
It now only remains for me to solicit the interference of my superiors who, I trust,
will adopt every means in their power to bring the Mexican government to a proper
sense of that duty which it owes to His Majesty’s subjects and their property in this
country.89
In his letter of 14 February 1832 Welsh appears to relish the perceived
weakness of General Caldero´n’s government forces, whilst his conﬁdence in
Santa Anna’s strong position is expressed with further bursts of enthusiasm.
He was clearly conﬁdent that Santa Anna would win because of his superior
military strength and widespread support throughout the country. We should
also note the way Santa Anna gained the support of individuals like Welsh by
ensuring trade was unaﬀected by the crisis, and law and order prevailed and
that, on this occasion, British interests were protected :90
Government troops, which arrived at Puente on the 2nd instant, since when they
have remained stationary ! As yet, they cannot bring more than 2,000 men against
the city, the desertion of oﬃcers and men is daily, sickness also has broken out
among them [_]. General Santa Anna has within the walls of the city and castle
1500 infantry and outside 200 regulars, cavalry exclusive of about 600 jarochos [_]
89 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 49–51: Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 31 Jan. 1832.
My emphasis.
90 Santa Anna was not consistent in protecting British interests. Although he clearly did so in
1832, it should be noted that within weeks of his victory in early 1833, he directly attacked
British interests by reducing the percentage of customs dues assigned to paying dividends
on the foreign debt, owed largely to British investors, from one sixth to 6 per cent. To add
insult to injury, he paid no further dividend on the debt during his time in power. Michael
P. Costeloe, private communication, 8 Nov. 2002.
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and 400 bushmen in ambuscades ; of the government forces 600 are cavalry and
consequently of little or no use in attacking infantry within fortiﬁed walls ! [_] I have
reason to believe that the commencement of hostilities in this quarter will be the
signal for a rise in several parts of the country against the present administration! !
The conduct of General Santa Anna towards the inhabitants of this city continues
most exemplary ; the merchants have not been in the least molested, nor have they
even been called [_] [to] pay their duties long overdue, a measure which they feared
would have been enforced ! The General has exclusive of future receipts, resources
suﬃcient for 7 months ! [_] I am particularly requested by General Santa Anna to
assure His Majesty’s Government that, so long as he commands, British interests
shall meet from him constant protection, in preference even to those of his own
countrymen!91
Pakenham was quick to respond. In his letter to Welsh of 6 February 1832
he instructed in unequivocal terms that Welsh should not interfere in the
political situation:
Should the extreme measure of an assault be unfortunately resorted to, there could
be no means so certain to bring down upon British subjects the evils which it is to be
hoped would otherwise be avoided, than their departing from the strict neutrality which it is
so necessary for them to observe ; and I have no hesitation in assuring you that, if any
violence were to be committed towards British property in the course of the present
hostilities, of a nature to induce His Majesty’s Government to demand indemniﬁ-
cation to the suﬀerers, no claim whatever for redress would be sanctioned by our Government in
favour of any persons, who might have been so imprudent as to compromise themselves by acts such
as those to which, in your letter of the 31st ultimo, you intimate the possibility of your having
recourse.92
Pakenham’s letter certainly made Joseph Welsh reconsider his position.
His attempts to imply that Pakenham had misunderstood him, in his letter of
11 February, suggest that he had realised that he risked losing his job. He
asserted that he was pleased to hear that his fears had been groundless, but
noted that, ‘ I sincerely trust your opinion may be veriﬁed ’. Welsh, however,
was unable to deny his convictions completely : ‘ I have not suggested that
British subjects would take up arms in defence of their lives and property in
case of the Government troops attacking the place, [which he had], but in
case of an attempt being made to plunder their property, in which latter case
I think every British subject will consider it his duty to defend it to the last ! ’93
The somewhat feeble pretence that he was advocating ﬁghting only if his
property was plundered, but was prepared to remain neutral, if his life was
threatened, does not make for a persuasive argument.
On 19 February Welsh noted that ‘General Santa Anna’s troops are in
high spirits, and little doubt can, I believe, be entertained of the result being
91 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 53–5: Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 14 Feb. 1832.
92 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 57–8: Richard Pakenham to Joseph Welsh, Mexico City, 6 Feb. 1832.
My emphasis.
93 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 59–60 : Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 11 Feb. 1832.
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favourable to them’.94 He repeatedly celebrated Santa Anna’s strong position,
military skills, decency and gentlemanly conduct whilst denigrating the
movements and intentions of the government forces. ‘The government
troops arrived on the 21st on the plains of Santa Fe where they halted. [_]
Up to the present date [they] have not moved except one mile to burn the
house of a poor farmer which they did on the 25th’. This contrasted with
General Santa Anna’s activities, who ‘ in a most daring manner ’ had ‘ taken
8 oﬃcers, near 300 men at two and a half leagues in the rear of their camp,
having besides marched 22 leagues of bad road in the short space of
36 hours ! ! ’95 In a letter dated 25 February, Welsh stated that ‘contrasted with
the generous conduct of Santa Anna’, Caldero´n’s intentions ‘would strike
horror into the hardest heart ’.96
What is most remarkable is that Welsh’s support of Santa Anna continued
unabated even after the severe defeat Santa Anna suﬀered at the battle of
Tolome (3 March 1832). This was the ﬁrst of four major pitched battles
that took place during the 1832 Civil War (Gallinero [18 September], San
Agustı´n del Palmar [29 September] and Rancho de Posadas [6 November]).97
Santa Anna’s regiment of 800 infantry and 600 cavalry suﬀered a death toll of
80 and a further 528 of his men were taken prisoner.98 According to Welsh’s
account of the battle, on 1 March, Santa Anna received ‘ information that the
government troops had raised their camp and were retiring towards Puente,
having suﬀered much from sickness and desertion! ’ Making the most of the
situation, ‘ the same night, Santa Anna marched out with 500 cavalry and
about 600 infantry with the intention of pursuing them to Puente ’. By the
afternoon of 2 March, Santa Anna had caught up with them in Manantial.
That night he ‘passed them, cutting oﬀ their supplies, water and retreat to
Puente ’ and called on them to surrender. On 3 March, having ‘ taken up a
strong position at Loma Alta near Tolome, where he has raised parapets and
placed his artillery ’, Caldero´n was able to resist Santa Anna’s attack, forcing
his withdrawal back to the port.99
From Welsh’s perspective, however, the defeat had not been as signiﬁcant
as it was later made out to be :
During the night numerous oﬃcers and troops of cavalry came in from the ﬁeld of
Tolome and at daylight General Santa Anna, slightly wounded, accompanied by a
few oﬃcers arrived, to the great satisfaction of the garrison. About the same time it
94 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 61 : Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 19 Feb. 1832.
95 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 63–4: Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 27 Feb. 1832.
96 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 66–9 : Joseph Welsh to J. O’Gorman, Veracruz, 25 Feb. 1832.
97 Were we to believe that Welsh’s santanismo stemmed from opportunism, from him seeking
to back the winning horse, we ﬁnd that we cannot argue this point convincingly in the light
of Welsh’s unwavering support of Santa Anna even after the battle of Tolome.
98 Costeloe, La primera repu´blica federal, p. 333.
99 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 77–8: Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 3 March 1832.
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was ascertained that the cavalry had sustained but a trivial loss and that more than
one third of the infantry escaped [_] the number of those returned and able to do
duty is near 200 [_] General Santa Anna has taken every precaution for the defence
of the city, for which purpose he can yet count on 1500 men.100
Only weeks after the defeat, Welsh was relishing the fact that, ‘ the govern-
ment troops have already commenced deserting again ’, and that he had
‘never seen Veracruz in such a state of defence as it is at present, and the
enthusiasm of the troops and inhabitants in general is very great ’.101 He
noted that, ‘ there are at present upwards of 2000 under arms in the city and
more are coming up from the coast [_] added to which, on an alarm being
given, Santa Anna can count on full 300 more civilians ! ! ’.102 Despite the
drawback of Tolome, he was convinced that should General Caldero´n attack
the port, ‘his troops must inevitably be cut to pieces as I have never seen
Veracruz in such a state of defence as it is at present and the enthusiasm of
the troops and inhabitants in general very great ’.103
In spite of Welsh’s attempts to disguise to Pakenham his willingness to
ﬁght, by the end of March Bustamante’s government requested that he be
replaced by a more ‘ impartial ’ diplomat. At the meeting held on 30 March
1832 the members of the Ayuntamiento of Xalapa noted, for the ﬁrst time,
receipt of a letter from the government in Mexico City informing them of
Joseph Welsh’s removal from his post as Vice Consul in Veracruz. As re-
quested by Pakenham, following a formal complaint from the Mexican
government, he was to be replaced by another individual ‘because of his
conduct in the pronunciamiento ’.104 However, several months passed before
this order was executed. Ciriaco Va´zquez refused point blank to accept Hugh
Dick as the new Vice Consul since the order for Welsh’s replacement had
been ‘ issued by a usurping and entirely illegal authority ’, and he felt he was
‘ in the sensible case of refusing to recognise and consider it ’.105 Santa Anna
emphasised that he could not accept an appointment made by a government
he did not recognise.106 One tactic to counter arguments that Welsh had
interfered in Mexican politics was to argue that Dick had been guilty of
political activity against the ‘ liberating army’ and in favour of Bustamante’s
100 PRO: FO50/77, ﬀ. 79–80: Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 6 March 1832.
101 PRO: FO 50/77, ﬀ. 74–5: Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 18 March 1832.
102 PRO: FO 203/47, ﬀ. 412–13 : Joseph Welsh to O’Gorman, Veracruz, 20 March 1832.
103 PRO: FO 203/47, ﬀ. 415–16 : Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 18 March 1832.
104 Archivo Histo´rico Municipal del Honorable Ayuntamiento de Xalapa (henceforth referred
to as AHMX): ‘Libro de acuerdos del ilustre ayuntamiento constitucional de la ciudad de
Jalapa para el an˜o de 1832, ’ vol. 43, ﬀ. 27–9: Minutes for the meeting of 30 March 1832.
105 PRO: FO 203/55, f. 9 : Ciriaco Va´zquez to Hugh Dick, Veracruz, 13 June 1832.
106 PRO: FO203/55, f. 26 : Antonio Lo´pez de Santa Anna to Hugh Dick, Veracruz, 27 June
1832.
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‘ illegal ’ government.107 This was done in a number of editorials of the
Veracruz newspaper El Censor that campaigned against the appointment of
Dick towards the end of September 1832.
Welsh was disgusted by his enforced resignation.
Sir,
I had the honour to receive on the 5th instant your oﬃcial under date of the 24th
ultimo notifying to me the resolution of the present administration no longer to
recognise me as British Vice Consul for this port. In conformity with your requi-
sition I ceased from that day to act in the capacity of His Majesty’s Vice Consul
(although the authorities here will continue to acknowledge me as such). I write to
His Majesty’s charge´ d’aﬀaires on this subject and have no doubt he will see the
justice of solely suspending me, pro tempore, as, in due course of time, I hope to
receive full satisfaction from the Mexican Government on this score ! In attention to
your instructions I shall retain the archives of this oﬃce in my possession until the
presentation of proper authority [_]. During my suspension, and the duration of
the present state of aﬀairs in this quarter, I shall continue to exert my inﬂuence as
hitherto in favour of British interests of which I beg you will acquaint the merchants
in the capital. I am happy to say that General Santa Anna continues to observe the
same line of conduct, and no British subject can say that he has been in the least
molested.108
He also implied that Pakenham did not have the courage to resist his
removal : ‘ I am no longer British Vice Consul, so that, after ﬁve years of
faithful services to His Majesty’s Government and subjects I am sacriﬁced to
the intrigues of the Mexican Government ! ! ’109 Furthermore, backed as he
was by Santa Anna, whose revolt would eventually triumph in December
1832, his forced resignation did not diminish signiﬁcantly the inﬂuence he
had succeeded in gaining in Veracruz.
After the better part of a year had passed and the veracruzanos were still
refusing to deal with Welsh’s replacement, Pakenham was forced to write to
Bernardo Gonza´lez in January 1833, to ask him to ensure Dick was accepted
as the legitimate British vice consul in Veracruz.110 However, attempts to
guarantee the return to normality in the vice consulate in Veracruz did not
succeed immediately. Santa Anna himself prevented O’Gorman from going
to Veracruz, and a complaint was also drawn up against O’Gorman for
having interfered in the nation’s politics by going to Veracruz to remove
Welsh.111
107 PRO: FO 203/55, ﬀ. 65–6 : Hugh Dick to Ciriaco Va´zquez, Veracruz, 14 Oct. 1832.
El Censor, 13, 19 and 20 Sept. 1832.
108 PRO: FO203/47, ﬀ. 422–23 : Joseph Welsh to O’Gorman, Veracruz, 13 April 1832.
109 PRO: FO203/47, ﬀ. 428–29 : Joseph Welsh to O’Gorman, Veracruz, 25 June 1832.
110 PRO: FO 50/79, ﬀ. 13–4: Copy of letter, Richard Pakenham to Bernardo Gonza´lez,
Mexico City, 30 Jan. 1833.
111 PRO: FO 50/79, ﬀ. 39–41: Richard Pakenham to Viscount Palmerston, Mexico City,
12 Feb. 1833.
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Although Welsh was removed from oﬃce in June 1832, the reverberations
of the event continued to be felt for over a year. A characteristic trait of Santa
Anna’s was that he remembered those who had proven useful to him.112 In
December 1833, with Santa Anna now serving as president, the caudillo asked
Pakenham whether it was possible to have Welsh re-appointed to the post
of vice consul in Veracruz. As Pakenham recorded in a letter to Viscount
Palmerston, Santa Anna,
a short time ago [_] expressed his desire to see Mr Welsh re-appointed to that
situation [_]. I told him that painful as it was to me to decline complying with his
wishes, I had felt it quite out of my power to accede to them on this point. I have to
add that General Santa Anna signiﬁed his intention of causing a note to be addressed
to me [_] declaring the falsity of the charges brought forward by the late govern-
ment against Mr Welsh, and also bearing testimony to the zeal which he had always
observed in Mr Welsh for the interest of His Majesty’s subjects while in charge of
the Vice-consulate at Veracruz.113
Following his removal from oﬃce, Joseph Welsh decided to remain in
Mexico rather than return to Ireland. With his wife Carmen he moved to
Xalapa and bought the Rancho Buena Vista, in the outskirts of the provincial
capital, on the road to Coatepec.114 In partnership with another Briton,
Maurice Jones,115 Welsh founded in 1840 and ran what was, at least initially,
the very successful textile factory Industrial Xalapen˜a.116 Welsh also had a
house in the main square of Veracruz, which he rented to one Francisco de
Borja Garay.117 Like so many other xalapen˜o entrepreneurs whose support of
112 An anecdote that exempliﬁes this aspect of Santa Anna’s character can be found in
Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico City, 1996), pp. 37–9, where he narrates
how Santa Anna had no trouble in remembering that Guillermo Valle, as a boy, helped
him during the 1828 siege of Oaxaca, and that on meeting him again, several years later, ‘ lo
levanto´ en sus brazos con emocio´n, toco´ despue´s la campana, escribio´ en un papel y a
poco, he ahı´, a Vallecito instalado con su beca en el colegio de San Ildefonso [_] con las
mismas consideraciones que si fuera el hijo del Presidente de la Repu´blica ’.
113 PRO: FO 50/80A, ﬀ. 284–87 : Richard Pakenham to Viscount Palmerston, Mexico City,
23 Dec. 1833.
114 AHMX: ‘Libro de acuerdos del ilustre ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Jalapa, corre-
spondiente al an˜o de 1836, ’ vol. 47, ﬀ. 72–3 : Minutes for the meeting of 13 Sept. 1836.
115 Joseph Welsh’s friendship with Maurice Jones and his brother J. H. Jones dated from as
early as 1830, perhaps earlier. On one occasion in which Welsh had to ‘ausentarse por
poco tiempo de Veracruz, ’ in 1831, he entrusted the consulate to J. H. Jones. Archivo
Histo´rico Municipal de Veracruz : Caja 162. Vol. 217, ﬀ. 63–6 : ‘Documento notiﬁcando la
ausencia del Vice-consul brita´nico D. Jose´ Welsh, ’ Veracruz, 19 Feb. 1831.
116 Nelly Josefa Leo´n Fuentes, ‘Los antagonismos empresariales de Xalapa en el Siglo XIX, ’
Anuario IX. Instituto de Investigaciones Histo´rico-Sociales Universidad Veracruzana (Xalapa, 1994),
p. 81.
117 Archivo General de Notarı´as del Estado de Veracruz (Xalapa) : Notario. Lic. Eduardo
Ferna´ndez de Castro, ‘Protocolo de Instrumentos Pu´blicos que se han otorgado por ante
mi en este presente an˜o de 1837, ’ ﬀ. 133–34: Contrato de arrendamiento, Veracruz, 21 Oct.
1837.
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the caudillo was rewarded by his largesse, Welsh beneﬁted from the boom of
the textile industry that developed in Xalapa during these years.
By 1841 Welsh was very much a respected member of xalapen˜o society.
With his textile factory thriving, he was in a position to grant some of his
land to the Ayuntamiento and started to play a relatively active role in the
community, helping with the organisation of the local police force, an insti-
tution he would show concern for throughout his life.118 He built the Dique
(dike) that stands to this day by the Lagos that spread along the south-west of
the city centre119 and in 1843, together with Juan Francisco de Ba´rcena, he
took it upon himself to restore and look after the Paseo Nuevo, cultivating
trees on its pavements.120 Yet, Welsh retained certain characteristics that
could arguably be depicted as typically British. He forbade the ﬁshing of
mojarra in the river alongside his factory, showed the utmost disgust at
people’s willingness to shoot down ducks he wanted to protect, and strove
hard to have the ayuntamiento forbid the disposal of rubbish in the proximity
of the bridge.121
Although he earned ‘many riches ’ between the mid-1830s and the mid-
1840s, by 1845 Welsh was near bankruptcy ; ‘because of unexpected accidents
that led to the decline of [his] assets up to the point of having to give them all
to his creditors ’.122 His personal circumstances became equally stressful
following his separation from his wife who walked out on him, one day ‘of
her own will [_], taking with her some very splendid [lucido] belongings and
valuable jewels, the produce of which will guarantee a monthly salary that
allows her to live comfortably in Veracruz ’.123 Welsh established a long-
lasting relationship with Asuncio´n Zayas with whom he had two children.124
As far as I know, he lived in Xalapa until he died.
118 AHMX: ‘Libro de acuerdos del muy ilustre ayuntamiento de esta ciudad de Jalapa del an˜o
de 1854, ’ vol. 66, ﬀ. 70–2: Minutes for the meeting of 22 May 1854. The Ayuntamiento, on
this occasion, had to deal with Jose´ Welsh’s complaint about ‘ la falta de policı´a que se
observa tanto en la calle en que vive como en las inmediaciones del puente del camino de
Coatepec ’.
119 AHMX: ‘Libro de acuerdos del ilustre ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Jalapa corre-
spondiente al an˜o de 1843, ’ vol. 55, ﬀ. 73–4: Minutes for the meeting of 22 April 1843.
120 AHMX: ‘Libro de acuerdos del ilustre ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Jalapa corre-
spondiente al an˜o de 1843, ’ vol. 55, ﬀ. 62–8: Minutes for the meeting of 5 April 1843.
121 AHMX: ‘Libro de acuerdos del ilustre ayuntamiento de la ciudad de Jalapa corre-
spondiente al an˜o de 1843, ’ vol. 55, ﬀ. 84–8: Minutes for the meeting of 12 May 1843.
122 ANBUV: ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de 1848, ’
ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
123 ANBUV: ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de 1848, ’
ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
124 ANBUV: ‘Registro alfabe´tico de instrumentos pu´blicos de este oﬁcio en el an˜o de 1848, ’
ﬀ. 383–84: Testamento de Jose´ Welsh, Xalapa, 16 Nov. 1848.
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Conclusion
A study of the events that led to the removal of Joseph Welsh from his post
as vice consul in the port of Veracruz illustrates a number of pertinent
points concerning nineteenth-century British diplomacy in Mexico and Santa
Anna’s activities during this period. In terms of the ethics of the Foreign
Oﬃce and its representatives abroad, Welsh’s story exempliﬁes the extent to
which, even as early as the 1830s, the idea of intervening in the politics of
another country was perceived to be a crime. Welsh himself recognised that
he had to ‘abstain from any interference in the political agitations of the
country ’, since this was ‘ inconsistent ’ with his ‘ situation’.125 His superior,
Richard Pakenham, also displayed a strong commitment to this ideal for the
way in which he strongly warned Welsh against ﬁghting in the conﬂict the
moment the suggestion was made and for the way he immediately agreed
to the Mexican government’s request to have the Vice Consul removed.
Pakenham’s refusal to have Welsh re-instated as Vice Consul, even when
Santa Anna asked him to do so, also shows that for a high-ranking British
diplomat like himself, the fact that Welsh had displayed a predisposition
to interfere in the Mexican political scene was enough to bar him from
returning to oﬃce thereafter. In other words, Pakenham did not have
Welsh removed in 1832 because the Bustamante government asked him
to do so, but because he believed Welsh’s conduct went against the ideal of
neutrality the Foreign Oﬃce aimed to uphold. It was for the same reason
that Pakenham refused to acquiesce to Santa Anna’s request for his re-
appointment. Had Pakenham been the weak ambassador Welsh made
him out to be, he would have obeyed Santa Anna just as he had obeyed
Bustamante before.
Welsh’s letters also conﬁrm a number of highly important issues con-
cerning Santa Anna’s conduct and subsequent political success. They show
how popular he was in his home province by 1832, something which would
prove decisive in this particular civil war given that the regular army stood
ﬁrm behind the government for the greater part of the conﬂict. Let us not
forget that Santa Anna defeated Bustamante, on this occasion, with the
almost exclusive help of armed civilians (the civic militias). In this sense, it is
important to stress how Santa Anna comes across as the natural leader of the
veracruzanos, consistently admired, supported and celebrated by the jarochada,
even following the debacle of Tolome. It is worth noting here, in the light of
Welsh’s account of Santa Anna’s extraordinary popularity, Timothy Anna’s
provocative Weberian view that, ‘ the caudillos, whether we like it or not and
whether the leaders of the central governments of the day liked it or not,
125 PRO: FO 50/77, f. 18, Joseph Welsh to Richard Pakenham, Veracruz, 4 Jan. 1832.
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were the legitimate and perhaps even natural leaders – the voices – of their
home provinces ’.126 Welsh’s letters illustrate, moreover, how he guaranteed
his troops’ allegiance.
Welsh’s story also allows us to appreciate the ways in which Santa Anna
obtained the support of the businessmen in the area, whether they were
Mexican or British, by ensuring that law and order prevailed and that com-
merce proceeded unharmed and protected. We can thus verify the extent
to which Santa Anna fulﬁlled that key function, common to most early
nineteenth-century caudillos as outlined in John Lynch’s typology, of acting,
on behalf of the elites, ‘as guardians of order and guarantors of the existing
social structure ’.127
We can also appreciate Santa Anna’s energetic disposition, the way he
came across as a man of action. For Welsh, and all those Mexicans who
supported Santa Anna at one stage or another during the early national
period, the caudillo was admirable precisely for the manner in which he
appeared to be tireless, always on the go, bounding with energy and courage.
We ﬁnd Welsh celebrating and praising the way Santa Anna rallied the
troops, inspected them personally, behaved in a ‘daring manner ’, capable of
marching ‘22 leagues of bad road in the short space of 36 hours ! ! ’128
The most illustrious citizen, the one who has tirelessly fought against Mexico’s
aggressors [_], the one [who] single-handed, without killing, has preserved the
public peace, because with the circumstances being the same for all Mexicans, he
alone, despite the hatred of his enemies, their lies and calumnies, has been the one to
stand out even in the most unfavourable of times, irrefutable proof that he is worth
much more than all those who envy and abhor him and who have not been able to
outshine this illustrious general.129
126 Anna, Forging Mexico, p. 22.
127 John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800–1850, p. 183.
128 PRO: FO 50/77, pp. 63–4: Joseph Welsh to John Bidwell, Veracruz, 27 Feb. 1832.
129 La Palanca, 19 June 1849.
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